American Indian Law Review
Volume 12

Number 2

1-1-1984

Federal Recent Developments

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Environmental
Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Gaming Law Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law
Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate
Commons, Tax Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Federal Recent Developments, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 259 (1984),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol12/iss2/6

This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact LawLibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ABORIGINAL TITLE: Wrongful Possession Actions Based on
Aboriginal Title
In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 12 Indian Law
Reporter 1005 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in part
and reversed in part the ruling of the Second Circuit.' In this suit
the Oneida Indian Nation of New York state sued Oneida County
for damages for two specified years caused by a wrongful possession claim. The wrongful possession claim was based on a 1795
land purchase from the Oneidas by the state of New York, which
was done in violation of the Non-Intercourse Act of 1793. The
Non-Intercourse Act provided that any land transactions with the
Indians be negotiated in the presence of a federally appointed commission to protect the Indian. Oneida County attacked the claim
on several theories. The Supreme Court held that the Oneida Nation retained a federal common law right of action for violation
of its possessory rights and that this common law right was not
preempted by the Non-Intercourse Act, which did not provide civil
remedies, nor was the land transaction ratified by federal approval
of later land transactions between the state of New York and the
Oneidas. Other defenses asserted by Oneida County were also held
unpersuasive. Although the transaction was more than 175 years
old, the Court could not find an applicable federal statute of limitations on the claim, nor would the Court apply the state statute
of limitations because to do so, it held, would conflict with an
underlying federal policy not to bar Indian claims that were brought
by the Indians themselves, as this policy was manifested in 28
U.S.C. § 2415(a)(b) and subsequent amendments.
The Court did not rule on a laches defense because it was denied
at the trial level and not raised at the appellate level, and neither
the defense of abatement nor that the issue fell within the political
question doctrine were found to have merit.
The Supreme Court did reverse the lower court on one issue.
Oneida County had cross-claimed against the state of New York
in the event liability was found. The lower courts allowed this
claim under the doctrine of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
However, the Supreme Court found this to be a question of state
law and questioned whether the state of New York's eleventh
amendment immunity had been waived as required to consent to

1. 105 S.Ct. 2173 (1985), aff'd in part andrev'd in part, 719 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1983).
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suit in federal court on this cross-claim. Finding a lack of evidence
on this issue, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred
in exercising ancillary jurisdiction over this claim and therefore
reversed and remanded on that issue.
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
In UnitedStates v. Burnett, 777 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1985), Harold
Ed Burnett was convicted of first degree murder in the Northern
District of Oklahoma. The murder victim was Laban Marchmont
Miles, a half-blood Osage Indian who was shot to death at his
home, a restricted Osage allotment in Osage County, Oklahoma.
The case was first brought in state court, which held that the state
of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction of the matter because the crime
was committed in Indian country and thus federal jurisdiction was
exclusive.
An indictment was then filed in federal district court charging
Burnett and two others with first degree murder. Burnett argued
in federal court, as he had in state court, that an Osage allotment
was not Indian country and that the state had criminal jurisdiction. Burnett argued two points. First, that the designation of Indian country only applied to original Osage allottees, and second,
that Congress has relinquished its guardianship over Osage
restricted allotments, terminating any basis for federal jurisdiction.
The court refused to accept either argument and, quoting United
States v. Ramsey,' said that a restricted Osage allotment in which
fee title is held by an Indian allottee who cannot alienate the property without approval of the Secretary of Interior is Indian country.
The conviction of first degree murder was affirmed.
1. 271 U.S. 467 (1925).

Gambling
The issue of gambling on Indian reservations was again litigated
in Carbazon & Morongo Bands of Mission Indians v. County of
Riverside, 783 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1986). The two bands filed in
federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief against
Riverside County, California, to prevent the county from enforcing its gambling ordinance against the bands. The state of California intervened.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit from a summary judgment issued
by the district court in favor of the bands, the county and the
state argued that state and local laws pertaining to gambling should
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apply on Indian reservations under (1) Public Law 280, (2) the
Organized Crime Control Act, and (3) federal common law.
The court said that since California only regulates the types
of activities operated by the bands rather than prohibiting them,
these activities were civil in nature and not against public policy.
Because Public Law 280 relates to criminal jurisdiction on reservations, the law would not pertain to the gambling activities. The
court also said that since the activities were not against public
policy in California, the Organized Crime Control Act was not
involved.
The court dealt with the federal common law question by balancing the state, federal, and tribal interests. The state interest involved was the prevention of intrusion of organized crime into
the state. The court said that there was no indication of organized crime on the reservation. The court went on to say that while
this might be a legitimate interest, it was far outweighed by the
federal interest of assisting tribes to find nonfederal money to
operate their governments and the bands' interest in acquiring that
money, creating jobs for their members, and providing services
to those members. The court affirmed the decision of the district
court granting injunctive relief to the bands.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: State Regulations on Reservation
Lands
The state of Washington sought review of a ruling by the EPA
that the state could not apply its regulation for hazardous waste
disposal upon Indians and non-Indians within the reservation.'
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) authorized states to regulate hazardous waste activities within the state,
reserving this regulation to the federal government until the state
program is equivalent to the federal program.2 The RCRA,
however, did not specifically exclude Indians or Indian tribes from
the Act and arguably, at least by implication through definitions
used in the RCRA, Indian tribes could be included within the
Act. The state of Washington argued that these references to Indian tribes evidenced an intention of Congress to allow regulation of the tribes within the Act.

1. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976).
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The EPA ruled that the Act does not specifically include Indians or Indian tribes, and thus, even if the state does implement
a program equivalent to the federal program, such a state program
will not reach the Indian reservation lands. The court of appeals
found this interpretation of the RCRA to be reasonable and, absent a clear legislative intent on the issue of state regulatory jurisdiction on the reservations, deference to the agency determination
must be observed. The court of appeals also emphasized that the
people of the state will not be without protection; because the
reservations will not fall under state regulatory jurisdiction, the
federal standard will remain intact as to the reservations. Also,
ideas of preservation of tribal sovereignty were emphasized and
allowing EPA to retain jurisdiction will give the agency an opportunity to promote tribal sovereignty by allowing the tribe to
participate in hazardous waste management. The EPA ruling was
affirmed.
FISHING RIGHTS: United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353
(9th Cir. 1985).
In yet another chapter of this long dispute over fishing rights between the state of Washington and the United States as trustee
for the Indian tribes, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
granted the state's petition for rehearing of an earlier decision
in the case.' The case involves treaty fishing rights and, specifically,
(1) whether hatchery fish are to be included in the amount of
fish apportioned by treaty (the hatchery fish issue), and (2) whether
the treaties impose a*duty upon the state to refrain from despoiling the fish habitat (the environmental issue).
The district court entered declaratory relief on the issues, stating
that hatchery fish were to be included in the fish to be apportioned by treaty and, second, that the state must refrain from
actions that would deprive the treaty Indians of the fish necessary
for their moderate living needs.
After vacating the denial of the state's petition for rehearing,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed with respect to the
hatchery fish issue and vacated the declaratory relief with regard
to the environmental issue. With respect to the enviroinmental issue,
the court of appeals reasoned that this issue did not meet the
necessary requirement of presenting a sufficient case or controversy
1. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1983).
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between the parties, and therefore was contrary to the exercise
of sound judicial discretion in that the declaration serves neither
the needs of the parties, the jurisprudence of the court, nor the
interests of the public. The court of appeals thought declaratory
relief on the environmental issue was simply too vague and uncertain absent concrete facts that presented an actual controversy
and the declaratory relief granted served only to confuse the legal
rights of the parties. Therefore, as to the hatchery fish issue, the
court of appeals affirmed and as to the environmental issue, the
court of appeals vacated the district court's determination of that
issue.
INDIAN LANDS: Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1985).
In an attempt to prevent the fractionalization of Indian allotments
through inheritance and devise to such a degree that a large number
of individuals owned undivided fractional interests of tracts of
land so as to make the land unproductive, Congress enacted the
Indian Land Consolidation Act in 1983.' Section 2206 of that Act
provided that:
No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted
land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subject to a tribe's
jurisdiction shall descendant [sic] by intestacy or devise but shall
escheat to that tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum
or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its
owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to
escheat.
The appellants here were potential heirs or named devisees within
six months after the Indian Land Consolidation Act was passed.
Appellants assert that the Act violates the fifth amendment protections against the taking of property without compensation. The
court of appeals agreed; it declared section 2206 unconstitutional
and reversed the holding of the district court. The holding was
based on the Sioux Allotment Act, which "has a specific clause
to the effect that acceptance of benefits thereunder by individual
Indians would be taken as a release of those individuals' claims
to tribal lands." '2 Therefore, each Indian allottee gained certain
vested rights through the Sioux land act and one of those vested
rights was the ability to dispose of lands upon their death.
1. Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2515, 2517 (1983), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2210 (1982).
2. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, § 16, 25 Stat. 888, 889.
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JURISDICTION
In National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 105 S.Ct.
2447 (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to determine whether a tribal
court has jurisdiction in a civil suit against a non-Indian, but may
not act until tribal remedies have been exhausted.
In this case, a Crow minor brought an action for personal injury damages in tribal court against a state school district. He
received a default judgment. The school district then asked the
federal district court to enjoin the execution of the tribal judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant. The district court
granted a permanent injunction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding no federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, noting
that the question of tribal court jurisdiction must be decided in
reference to the federal law. However, the Court said the federal
jurisdiction was not exclusive. Unlike criminal cases, there is no
legislation concerning tribal jurisdiction over civil disputes between
Indians and non-Indians. The Court said, therefore, it was inappropriate to bring the case in federal court before all tribal remedies
were exhausted. The Court said that jurisdiction in the tribal courts
depends on the extent of the tribe's sovereignty, any changes or
limits set by Congress, and provisions of federal law, treaties, court
decisions, or administrative orders. Thus the tribal court must
determine its jurisdiction before the question may come before
a federal court.
The Court remanded the case to the district court to decide
whether to dismiss the case or hold it in abeyance pending the
tribal court's further action.
JUVENILES: Indian Child Welfare Act
In Kiowa Tribe v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985), the Kiowa
Tribe attacked in federal court a decision of a Kansas court that
allowed a non-Indian couple to adopt a child who the tribe contends is an Indian subject to the requirements of the Indian Child
Welfare Act. The adoption of the child, born out of wedlock to
an Indian father and a non-Indian mother, was being handled
by a Kansas state court. When the court found out that the ICWA
was possibly involved, the court recessed and notified the Kiowas,
who filed to intervene. After considering briefs, the court ruled
that the ICWA was not applicable and denied the tribe's motion
to intervene. The tribe appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court,
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which affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow tribal intervention.
Rather than appealing to the United States Supreme Court, the
tribe brought suit in federal district court. The federal district court
held that the suit was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel and dismissed the suit. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding
that full faith and credit must be given to the state court judgment because the state proceedings satisfied the minimum procedural requirements of the fourteenth amendment and the due
process clause of 'the United States Constitution.
The circuit court said that once the tribe elected to pursue the
appeal through the state court system, the only review from the
Kansas Supreme Court was directly to the United States Supreme
Court by appeal or petition for certiorari. A collateral attack in
federal district court was barred.
TAXATION: State Taxation on Mineral Leasing of Tribal Lands
The state of Montana imposed taxes on the Blackfeet Tribe's
royalty interests in oil and gas produced under leases issued by
the tribe on unallotted reservation land. The leases were executed
to non-Indians who paid the taxes to the state and deducted the
payment from royalty payments due the tribe.' The tribe sought
injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Montana. Montana claimed jurisdiction pursuant to a 1918 statute,'
which authorized states to tax these lands and which was later
amended in 1924.1 A subsequent act passed in 1938 did not
authorize state taxation of these royalty interests." The tribe argued
that the general repealer clause in the 1938 Act invalidated the
1929 Act and thus the state taxation was invalid. The district court
granted summary judgment to the state and the court of appeals,
on rehearing, reversed in part and affirmed in part.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals and held that
in light of two fundamental canons of statutory construction
regarding Indian law, the leases executed under the 1924 Act could
be taxed by the state. However, because of the repealer, the leases
executed under the 1938 Act could not be taxed by the state. The
canons of construction relied upon were (1) that states may tax
Indians only when Congress has clearly manifested its consent to

1.
2.
3.
4.

Montana v. Blackfeet tribe, 105 S.Ct. 2399 (1985).
Act of Feb. 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U.S.C. § 397.
Act of May 29, 1984, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, 25 U.S.C. § 398.
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25 U.S.C. §§ 391-4166).
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such taxation, and (2) that statutes are to be construed liberally
in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted
to their benefit. The Supreme Court emphasized that these canons
of statutory construction were rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.
Tribal Taxation Authority over Tribal Lands
The Navajo Tribe's authority to impose taxes on both members
of the tribe and nonmembers alike was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.' In 1978 the Navajo Tribal Council enacted two ordinances
that imposed taxes on leasehold interests on tribal lands and the
receipts from business activity within the Navajo Nation. These
taxes were passed without the Secretary of Interior's approval since
that approval was not required by the Navajo constitution with
regard to tax enactments. Petitioners brought an action in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Arizona to invalidate the taxes.
The district court held the taxes required approval of the Secretary
and enjoined the tribe from enforcing the tax. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' holding that the power to tax is an
essential attribute of self-government and territorial management
and that neither the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,2 nor the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 19381 required the Secretary of
the Interior to approve tribal tax enactments.
1. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navaho Tribe, 105 S.Ct. 1900 (1985).
2. 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-92.
3. 52 Stat. 347, 25 U.S.C. § 396(a).

WATER RIGHTS: Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton
This case involves yet another chapter of this 14-year-old dispute.'
Walton, a non-Indian successor of Indian water rights and a
number of Indian allottees sought water from the No Name Creek
Hydrological System for irrigation purposes. The tribe sought water
from the same system to establish trout-spawning grounds for the
Ozark Lake Fishery. The court here readjusted the district court's
water allocation to the respective parties. In making the ad-

1. 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985), reh. denied, 758 F.2d 1324, cert. denied, 106 S.Ct.
1183 (1986). See Walton 1, 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978) and Walton II, 647
F.2d 92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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justments, the court of appeals looked to the number of irrigable
acres Walton owned and the amount of water he appropriated
with reasonable diligence for irrigation.
The court emphasized that once perfected, a water right must
be maintained by continued use or it is lost. This calculation required investigation into the diligence of the immediate grantees
from the original Indian allottees in this pursuit and continuing
through the chain of title to the immediate possessor. Applying
this criteria, the court of appeals found Walton irrigated 30 acres
and, using the concept of "water duty" of 4 acre-feet per year
to determine beneficial uses, allocated Walton 120 acre-feet per
year.
The Indian allottee's allocation was based on the district court's
finding of 166.6 irrigable acres or a beneficial use of 666.4 acrefeet per year. However, the district court only awarded 428.8 acrefeet per year since only 107.2 acres were being irrigated. The court
of appeals found the reduction to be in direct conflict with the
mandate in Walton II and reinstated the full 666.4 acre-feet
allocation.
The court of appeals also held that the tribe has a reserved
right to sufficient water to permit natural spawning of the trout.
Therefore, based on expert testimony accepted at trial, sufficient
water for this purpose amounted to 350 acre-feet per year.
Since all parties have a priority date as of the creation of the
reservation and since the estimated water supply is 1,000 acre-feet
per year, the court of appeals held that each party should bear
this proportionate share of any adjustment required by water
shortages.
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